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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
W. S'.\IOOT BRIMHALL, Commissioner
of Financial Institutions of the State of
Ftah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
D. SPENCER GROW; ARTA L.
GROW; STEVEN L. GROW; FIRST
FIDELITY THRIFT AND LOAN ASTION; WESTERN LAND CORPORATION; GROW INVESTMENT
AND MORrrGAGE COMPANY, and
TOWN AND COUNTRY REAL ESTA TE COMPANY,
Drfendants and Appellants.

Case No.

12103

APP·ELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to set aside conveyances of real prop(•rty. In l\Iareh of 1967 D. Spencer Grow and Arta L.
Grow, his wife, conveyed one parcel of real property to
their son Steven L. Grow and conveyed two parcels of
real property to their son Steven and their daughter Gina
M. Grow. Gina is not a party to this action. During the
period September, 1966, through March, 1967, the three
defendant corporations conveyed five parcels of real
pro1wrty to Steven L. Grow.
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At no time, either prior or subsequent to said conveyances, have any of the grantors, individual or corporate,
been adjudicated a bankrupt or entered into an assignment or composition for the benefit of creditors. Nevertheless, this action is brought by plaintiff alleging mimatured tort claims against the individual grantors and
unsatisfied deficiency ju<lgments against the corporate
grantors. The deficiency judgments were entered after
the dates of the conveyances sought to be set aside.
The present action is best understood in context witl1 '
two other cases now pending in lower courts. One of the
lower court actions, entitled ''In the Matter of the Liquidation and Suspension of Utah Savings & Loan Association" (herein designated "liquidation proceedings")
was filed by plaintiff in November, 1966 in the District
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, Civil No.
30,309. In this action liquidation of the said Utah Savings
& Loan Association is currently in process and losses, if
any, to be sustained by depositors or shareholders have
not yet been ascertained.
The other lower court action (herein designated "officer and director liability proceeding") was filed by plaintiff in the District Court in and for Utah County, State
of Utah, Civil No. 32,027, in .May, 1968 against numerous
defendants including, among others, all of the gr an tor
defendants in the present action. This second action seeks
to impose liability upon the personal and corporate defendants for certain losses, not yet ascertained or determined, allegedly sustained or to be sustained by Utah
Savings & Loan Association. The lowN court, contem-
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11l11ti11g trial of the matter would be held in the summer
of 1%8, entered a. preliminary injunction in this second
adion preventing disposition by the defendants of their
properties and assets. Thereafter the case was removed
to the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, and
assigm•cl Civil No. 181,123, where the case is still awaiting- trinl.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
rrhe present action was tried at Provo, Utah in June,
19G9 before Hon. Ferdinand Erickson who was invited
s1wrially from the Sixth Judicial District to try the case
due to the disqualification of all other judges in the
1''ourth District from hearing the matter. Upon trial the
eourt found in favor of plaintiff, ordered the conveyance::;
sd aside, and directed that the reconveyed properties be
sold in satisfaction of certain deficiency judgments in
favor of plaintiff resulting from mortgage foreclosure
proeeedings in otht>r actions. Defendants appeal from
tlw judgment of the lower court.

I-tELIEF ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment entered
by the lower court and an order remanding the case with
direction that appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment
he granted. Iu th<> alternative, the case should be remanded to the lower court for further hearing to determine the equitable interest of Steven L. Grow in the suhject properties.
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STATEMENT OF POIN'l1S RI£LIED UPON

I. Defendants' Motion for Smnmary Judgment should

have been granted because plaintiff failed to meet
the required burden of proof.

A.

Plaintiff offered no evidence to support mam
allegations of plaintiff's complaint.
·

B.

Plaintiff offered no proof the properties conveyed had value at the time of such conveyances.

C.

Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof required bv the Uniform Fraudulent Convevances
Act.
.
.
1.
2.

3.

Plaintiff offered no proof of insokency of
the individual grantors.
The sole evidence intended to prove insolvency of the corporate defendants was improperly admitted in evidence and legally
inPffective for its intended purpose.
No presumption of fraudulent conveyance
arose.

IL Defendants' evidence showed the conveyances were
made for fair consideration.
III. The rf'lief granted exceeds that prayed in the complaint and authorized by law.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANTS' M 0 TI 0 N FOR SUMMARf
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE
REQUIRED BURDEN OF PROOF.
Defendants' motion for summary jwlgment, made
when plaintiff rested its case, (See Transcript, page 40,
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line 28 et S<'q.), was taken under advisement but was subdenied by the court. Only the first 40 pages of
tlw trial transcript representing the plaintiff's case need
liP com;idered in determining the merits of defendants'
rnoti on.

A. Plaintiff offered no evidence to support
many alle9rdions of the complaint bPforc resting its

case.

In addition to alleging the fact of the conveyances,
·whieh fact is not disputed, plaintiff's complaint alleges:

1. ri1 hat " .... D. Spencer Grow was president
controlling managing agent of . . . [the corporate
<lefendants]." (Complaint, paragraph 2)
COl\fM.ENT: Prior to resting its case, no evid!mce was offered by plaintiff showing any relationship whatsoever between the personal defendants
and the corporate defendants.
2. That the grantors " ... do not have sufficient
property ·with which to satisfy the debts which they
owe to the plaintiff in his control of the business and
assets of Utah Savings & Loan Association." (Complaint, paragraph 10)
COl\L\fENT: This fails to allege insolvency
of thP grantors at the time of the subject conveyanCPs or by rPason thereof. Further, before resting its cast-'. plaintiff offered no direct evidence
showing the financial condition of the grantors
at any time. To prove insolvency of the corporate
5

defendants, plaintiff relied solely upon a presumption of insolvency claimed to arise from
return of executions unsatisfied, as discussed
here aft e r. Any presumption of insolvency
raised by return of executions unsatisfied is lirni ted to the corporate defendants only, since no
judgments have been entered against the personal defendants. Plaintiff did provide evidencf
that defendants have substantial property holdings, however, as indicated by the legal descriptions of 561 separate parcels of real property
attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint
filed in the officer and director liability proceeding, a copy of which was admitted in evidence herein as Exhibit P-11.
3. "The property affected by the deeds was acquired by the defendants under the direction and
control of the defendant D. Spencer Grow with monies borrowed from Utah Savings & Loan Association
while Utah Savings & Loan Association was under
the management and control of the defendant D.
Spencer Grow." (Complaint, paragraph 11).
COMMENT: No evidence was offered by plaintiff showing the circumstances under which the
subject property was acquired by the def endants.
4. "'The aforesaid conveyances were wholly voluntary and made without a valuable consideration."
(Complaint, paragraph 12).
6

COMMENT: No evidence was submitted in support of this allegation.
5. "At the time of the execution of the aforesaid
deeds, said Steven L. Grow, grantee therein, had full
kuowledge of the fraudulent intent and purpose of
the defendant, D. Spencer Grow." (Complaint, paragraph 13).
COMMENT: When plaintiff rested its case, no
evidence had been offered by plaintiff in support
of the allegation that actual fraudulent intent was
involved, nor was evidence offered by plaintiff
showing the knowledge of Steven L. Grow with
respect to any matter whatsoever covered by
this action.

B. Plaintiff offered no proof the properties
conveyed had value at the time of sitch conveyances.
Counsel for plaintiff acknowledged at trial plaintiff's obliga ti on to furnish evidence that the property
conyeyed had a net value, and cited the case of Zuniga r. Ei·a11s, 87 Utah HlS, 48 P.2d 513 (1935) in support thereof. (See Transcript, page 19, lines 8-10).
'T'h<' grantors' net equity in the subject properties
conld not lw IH"OYed "·ithout evidence of and adjustnwnts from the gross yalue for the amount of mortgag<>s, tax delinquencies or other encumbrances
against surh properties. Plaintiff then produced an
abstractor, Mr. :l\Iadsen, and it was stipulated that he
ha(l sParcJwd title of the properties as of June 6,
1.96'D at 8:00 a.m. and that his profferred testimony
7

concerning recorded encumbrances ·would not includt>
evid<>nce of any search with rPspect to delinqu<'nt
taxes, s1wcial impru\'ements or other levies. (SPr
Transcript, pages 21-24).
The profferred aml stipulated testimony of
valnes of the conveyed properties and partial testimony concerning some encmnhranct•s against thr
properties constituted incomplete <'vidence which
failed to provide proper proof that the properties
had any nPt value attributable to the grantors-evPn
as of the time of trial. Even more important, however, is that all of the com'e)'ancPs took vlace at lea8t
21 months prior to the time of trial and not a scintilla of evidence was presented with respect to tlw
net values of such properties in the hands of defendants as of the dates of th<> respectire conveyances, nor
of the value of improvements made hetwePn the dates
of conveyance and time of trial.
Accordingly, plaintiff failed to meet an essential element of its required proof which constitutes a fatal defect
in plaintiff's effort to establish a prima facie' case.
C. Plaintiff failed to meet the b11rde11 of proof
required by the Uniform Frmulnle nt Crmveym1crs
Act.

Plaintiff has not been specific in eiting the provisions
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (Utah Code
Annotated, Sectiorn; 23-1-1 ct. seq., 195:3 Rplmt. Vol.,
herein designated "UFCA") which it believes to hP con-
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irnlling in this action, and instead
genPral Pncyclo1wdic works on the
nwril:-· rases decided before Utah
A diffrrence of proof is rPqnired,
:·a·dicrn n•garded as controlling.

quoted at trial from
topic and cited prienacted the UFCA.
depending upon the

At trial (See Transcript, page 4, lines 7-9) plaintiff
ass<•rted its case against the individual defendants, D.
Grow and Arta L. Grow to be premised upon
Ncdion 25-1-16 (there exists no Section 25-1-17 cited by
plantiff's eounsel and the context indicates that Section
was intendPd). This section does not define tlle
d<>tnt>nts of a fraudulent conveyance but merely sets forth
alteriwtive reuwdit>s. Pren•quisite to application of any
one remedy is a finding by the court that the conveyance
is "fraudulent," which in turn requires that the evidence
satisf:-· tlw essential elements of proof defined in various
other sections of the UFCA. In attempting to discern the
fonndation upon whirh plaintiff premises its claim herein,
it becomes necessary to survey the possibilities presented
11ndc•r tlw UFCA.
(a) Under Section 25-1-4 the required proof
consists of (a) a conveyance, (b) insolvency at time
of or bv r<>ason of the conveyance, and ( c) absence
of fair eonsideration. A person is insolvent wiillin
tli<' meaning of the lTFCA: " ... when the present
fair salahl<> value of his assets is less than ille amount
that will be required to satisf>T his probable liability
on his existing debts as they bE>come absolute and
rnatmc·cl." (S<>ction 25-1-2) Because no evidence was
pn·smt<>d by plaintiff at trial showing insolvency of
9

the individual defendants and because the only evidence of insolvency of the corporate defendants related to plaintiff's reliance upon return of execution
unsatisfied, this section is applicable to the plaintiff's case only with respect to conveyances by the
corporate grantors and subject to the validity of the
arguments concerning nulla bona execution::;, as discussed hereafter.
(b) No allegations of the complaint or proof
offered at trial include the evidentiary provisions
required under St>ctions 25-1-5, 25-1-6, and 25-1-7,
pertaining to under capitalization of a business concern or scientor of a grantor about to incur obligations beyond his ability to pay.
( c) Under Section 25-1-8 (cited in plaintiff's
post-trial memorandum) the required proof consists
of (a) a conveyance and (b) intent to delay, hinder
or defraud the creditors. 8ince plaintiff presented no
evidence at trial of actual intent, application of this
statute is dependent upon the plaintiff's reliance npon
presumed fraudulent intent and a shift in the burden
of proof discussed hereafter. This section requires
proof that the conveyance substantially prejudices
attempts by creditors to receive satisfaction of their
claims. It should be noted that this section is nniqne
to Utah law, it is not part of the UFCA as propos<'<l
by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and has been
by the
Utah Supreme Court as merely declaratory of the
principles of the common law. V'nitrd States v. Latr
10

Corporation of the Church of Jestis Christ of Latterd11y Saints, 5 Utah 538, 18 P. 35 (1888).
( d) Other sections of the UFCA defining
fraudulent conveyances relate to facts and circum;,.;tances not falling within those presented by the case
lll'esently under consideration by the courts.
1. Plai·1diff offered 1w proof of insolvency of
the indi'l:irfoal grantors.
vVhen plaintiff i·ested its case there was no evidence
\\·haboever relating to the assets or liabilities of the defrndants at the time of the subject conveyances. The comment set forth under paragraph I.A.2. at page 4, supra.,
is restated and incorporated by this reference. Hence, conby the per::;onal defendants evidenced by Exliihi ts Pl, P2, P6, and P7, are not subject to plaintiff's
argument that return of execution unsatisfied is presumptin• of insolwncy, and the only possible reliance by plaintiff on Rections 25-1--1 or 25-1-8 would be with respect
to conn'.vances by the corporate defendants.

2. The sole c1:idence intended to prove insolrency of the corporate defendants was improperly
admitted in eridence and legally ineffective for its
i11tenrlcd 1n1rposc.
As vroof of insolvency of the corporate defendants,
plaintiff's sole evidence consisted of certain court files
(
PVn showing deficiPncy judgments against the
said C'orporat<- defendants and unsatisfied return of exe-

11

cution thereon. The records of deficiency judgments as
evidence of the insolwncy of the corporate
wer!:' admitted in evidence over tlw objection of the defendants. (See Transcript, page 11, lines 21-24). Their
admission by the court apparently was intended solely
to permit their consideration in connection with other
proof as to the financial condition of the corporate defendants. (See Transcript, page 11, lines 17-20). No such
other proof was presented by plaintiff before resting
its case.
At the time of trial d!:'f Pndants pointed out to the
court that in each case the judgments represented by the
fourteen separate files were all entered and executions
thereon issued after the dates of the connyances challenged herein. (See Transcript, page 10, lines 8-20).
A table showing the essential data with respect to such
executions in relation to the dates of subject conveyances
is shown herein as Exhibit "A" to this brief.
Cases construing the UFCA consistently hold that
circumstances relative to the grantor's financial conclition subsequent to the conveyance are immaterial in determining prior solvency. In the case of T.TV.M. Homes,
Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Inrestmr11t Co., 29 Cal. Rptr.
R87, 214 Cal. App. 2d 826 (1963), the court held that since
insolvency must exist at the time of the conveyance or
must result therefrom, subsequent insolvency is not of
itself a sufficient foundation for an inference of insolvency at the time of the allegedly fraudulent conveyance.
In the case of Nevers 1.:. Hack, 138 Ind. 260, 37 N.E. 791
(1894) the court held that insolvency of tlw debtor at the
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time when suit is brought to set aside his conveyance as
fraudulent does not raise a presumption that insolvency
existed prior to that time. See also Neubauer v. Cloutier,
:2Gf> l\Iinn. 539, 122 N.\;V. 2d 623 (1963);
v.
Jacobs, 18 N.J. Super 438, 87 A.2d 356 (1952); In re
l)iq11id111atic Systems, Inc. 194 F. Supp. 625 (D.S.D. Cal.
1961).
Plain ti rf further asserts that return of an unsatisfied
<>xecntion is evidence of insolvency which is not subject to
rdrnttal or refutation, and cites as authority for this positio11 the cases of Enright c. Grant, 5 Utah 334, 15 P. 268
(] 887) and
State Bank 1·. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P.
7<if> (1
). The Enright decision, by a divided court,
lwld that while return of an execution nulla bona may (in
of allegations not present in the instant case)
evidence of the debtor's insolvency during a
period s1t7Jseq11ent to that return, it does not hold such
r0tnrn to bP t>i tlwr inference or proper evidence of insolwncy prior to the unsatisfied return of execution.

In Enright the court considered a judgment entered
upon default and failure of the defendant to file an
answer. Tlw court clearly indicated that a return of an
Px:ecntion 1wlla. bona constituted evidence of the debtor's
insolvency only when in substantiation of the "allegation
that tlw plaintiffs know of no property upon which an
c·xecution can be levied, and that the judgments must remain wholly nnsatisfiPd, unless they can resort to equity."
(Fi P. at 271, 272). Observing that it was considering only
the snffiriency of the pleading as the basis for a default
·11dcrrnent
thP conrt obsPrved "When it comes to the proof
•1
I"'
'
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[of the debtor's insolvency], it may be difficult to <»stablish, but we are dealing with it now as a pleading, and not
as to what would constitute sufficient proof... " (15 P.
at 272). Plaintiff's complaint lacks any allegation that
plaintiff knows of no other property belonging to the
judgment debtors from which the deficiency judgments
can be satisfied; consequently, the Enright decision is
not proper precedent in the present case where plaintiff
not only knew of substantial other property owned by
the judgment debtors, but had alreadv
. cansed the court
to enjoin the judgment debtors from disposing of such
other property.
-

In deciding the Barker case the court apparPntly believed it was merely following the Enright decision, but
if the Bark<'r case stands for the proposition relied upon
by plaintiff, it goes beyond the holding in Enright with
respect to permitting use of an execution returned unsatisfied as evidence of insolvency preceding the return
on execution. This rnling is at variance with the strong
weight of authority in other jurisdictions as cited above,
the consequences the·reof seem not to have been fully <'Xplored by the court, and such interpretation of the case
should not be followed. If the Barker case supports the
position relied upon by plaintiff, it should be overruled
for the reason that a return of service unsatisfied in one
county should not conclusively bar the judgment debtor
from proving his solvency and showing the existence of
other assets in adjoining counties or nearby areas where
the judgment creditor can conveniently obtain jurisdiction, nor should a judgment debtor be conclusive•ly prevented from showing the existence of other assets which

14

tlw 8lu•riff may have oyerlooked or disregarded in returni11g the execution unsatisfied.

The Barker ruling should further be distingui8hed
Oil thr grounds that (1) it was decided prior to adoption
of th<' UFCA in Utah, (2) the prime effect of showing
retnrn of execution unsatisfied at that time was pro('1 dural in order to establish that a judgment creditor
had exhausted his legal remedies and was now entitled
to eqnitahle relief, whereas setting aside a fraudulent
1·onvp:;ance under the UFCA is now a statutory legal
I>rncePcling for which proof of exhaustion of legal remedi(•s is no longer prerequisite, and (3) the legislative
intrnt nnderlying mactrnent of the UFCA requires that
proof lw furnished of the elements of action set forth in
ih: varions provisions, while the former procedural prec:mnption of insolyency arising upon merely showing return of execution unsatisfied does not create a presumption of suhstantfre insolvency as required under the UFCA.
Tiu· rnling in the Barker case is further inapplicable
111 the vresent action b<'cause plaintiff is estopped from
asserting a presnmption of insoh-ency based upon return
or execntion lllllln bona because of (a) its failure to plead
and prove that it had no knowledge of other properties
l'rnm whieh thP deficiency judgments could be satisfied,
( h) its own ('Vidence of the existence of such other propnties, and ( c) its prior conduct in thwarting the success
or thP exPcntions upon which it relies for such presumption. Plaintiff entered into evidence a copy of its complaint in th1c• officer and dirPctor liability action (Exhibit
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Pll) together with a copy of the preliminary injunction ,
entered by the court in that aetion on July 11, 1968 (Ex- ,
hibit Pl 2) restraining defendants from conveying their
properties. Attached to that complaint as Exhibit "A"
is a 12-page, single-spaced, legal size, typewritten description of 561 separate parcels of real property ac- •
knowledged by plaintiff to lw owned by these and other
defendants and on which plaintiff had also filed lis
pendcns noticPs. Filing the complaint in the offieer and
director liability action, rt>cording the lis pcndens notices,
and obtaining entry of the temporary injunction with respect to the numerous properties all preceded return of
service unsatisfied herein. (See Exhibit "A" to this
brief).
Plaintiff failed to plead the lack of properties from
which the d(c'ficiency judgments could be satisfied because
it well knew that defendants her0in owned extensive
properties having substantial value, and tlw only reason
the rxecutions were returned unsatisfied was because
plaintiff's own lis pend ens and injunction shielded all assets of these deftmdants from snch subsequent execution.
Under these circumstancPs it would be an utmost incongruity and injustice to permit the plaintiff to assert these
unsatisfied executions as any level of evidence of insolvency of the defendants. Rather, plaintiff's own evidence
before the court showing that defendants havP substantial
assets which arP already secured to plaintiff's purposes
under injunction has only strengthenPd the presmnption
of defendants' solvency.

16

3. No prcs111nptio11 of frandulent co1n-eyance
aroi'Je from relationship of the parties to shift the
lnirdcn of proof to defenda·nts.
Plaintiff asserts that by showing the individual
gT:mtors w0rr close relatives of the grantees, plaintiff
was relieved of its bur<len of proving fraud aud there was
th<'n'hy imposed upon defendants a burden of proving
that no fraud existed. It should first be observed that
when plaintiff rested its case uo evidence had been introducPd showing any relationship betwt'en the personal
dPfrndants and the corporate defendants, and no family
relationship can exist between the personal grantees and
thP <'orporatt> grantors; hence, if the position had any
111<·rit it ·would be confined in application only to conveyanePs hy the individual grantors. More important, how<'\·er, is that no such presumption arises even with respect
to tlH' personal defendants without the existence of other
fartors not before the court in this action when the plaintiff rest<•d its case.
'Vhile a close family relationship is just cause for
sp('cial s<'rutiny, such relationship alone is insufficient
to cn'atp a legal pre::;mnption of fraud which shifts the
burden of vroof. In Givan v. Lambert, 10 Utah 2d 287,
:l;)l P.2d 959 (1960) the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
by a father to his children against attack
b.v judgment creditors, stating:

It is elementary that the love and affection a
father has for his children is sufficient consideration to support a conwyancP, absent fraud. (351
P.2d at 963).
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After discussing the early English rule that intra-family
transactions be subjected to careful examination for evidences of frand, tile court further stated:
Hnman nature doesn't set•m to liave changed ven
much and we still take for granted that
tions between close relatives under circmnstance::;
of this kind an• to he closelv scrutinized when attacked by creditors of tlw gTantor. However, the
mere fact that the transaction is among close relatives does not 11ccessarily mrnn that it is inrnlid,
hut the true farts an· suhjed to proof. (351 P.2d
at 962, emphasis added).

In Ned J. 1Jowma11 Co. 1·. TVhite, 13 Utah 2cl 173.
369 P.2cl 962 ( 1962), the comt rejected an attack by
judgment creditors and upheld the validity of a mortgage
given b>· a fatlwr to his son, stating:
"\Vhilt> C'onveyances lwtween close relatives arc
subject to rigid scrutiny, that fact alone does not
render the conve)·ance fraudulent. vVhether a conveyance is frandnlent as to creditors must bf'
determin('d from thP facts of each case and from
the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
... " (:3<i9 P .2cl at 963.)
Although some Utah cases decided vrior to enactment of the UFCA are not fonude<l npon proof of particular elements now rP<p1ired under the statute (see e.g.
Gustin 1c. Matl1fws, 25 Utah lGS, 70 P. 402 (1902), even
the 0arlier cas1•s upon which plaintiff primaril>· relies refused to shift the> hurdPn of proof in the absenen of additional faetors <·videneing fraud.
The UFCA sPts forth the elements of proof reqnirf>d
of plaintiff as the price of tlH• n•mt>dy sought. This stat-
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nte specifically n'quires either proof of actual fraud
(which has not been presented in this case) or a presumption of fraud. While elenwnts in addition to proof of the
grantor's insolvency may be essential to proving fraud, M
lJrcswnptfon of fraiul can arise without proof of the
qra11tor's insolvency at the time of or by reason of the conrcyunce. If plaintiff relies upon return of execution nulla
/Jona for a presumption of insolvency as a necessary
element in creating a presumption of fraud between relaor closely connected parties, plaintiff has failed to
l•::;tablish a prima facie case because the law will not
pPrrnit a presumption to be based upon a presumption.
(See 29 Am. Jnr. 2d 204,
166. Also Denver &
R.G.R. Co. v. Ashton-Whitc-8killiconi, 49 Utah 82, 162 P.
82 (1916).)
Further, no presumption of fraud can arise from the
of a conveyance between close relatives
unless direct evidence of other factors indicating fraud
is fnrnished as supporting evidence. No such evidence
had been presented when plaintiff rested its case.
II. DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE SHOWED THE
CONrEYANCE8 WERE MADE FOR FAIR CONSIDRRATION.

The evidence adduced by defendants at trial with
respect to each of the conveyed properties successfully
rontroverted and disproved each and every allegation
hy plaintiff that the conveyances were made without fair
consideration. A summary of defendants' evidence on
this point is tabulated in Exhibit "B" attached to this
brief and incorporated by reference.
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Ill. THE RELIEF GRANTED EXCEEDS TIIAT
PRAYED IN THE COMPLAINT AND AUTHORIZED
BY LAW.
The entire prayer of plaintiff's complaint reads:
"\\Therefore, plaintiff prays that the aforesaid deeds be
set aside as fraudulent." Tt does not contain the customary request for "further relief." Notwithstanding, the
lower court not only set the conveyances aside but directed that the subject properties be sold in satisfaction of
certain deficiency judgments.
Plaintiff has made an election of remedies making
it improper to receive the benefit of a court order requiring sale of the subject properties prior to termination
of the preliminary injunction in the officer and director
liability action. By seeking and obtaining entry of the
preliminary injunction plaintiff has rendered the grantor
defendants helpless to apply any part of their property
or assets in satisfaction of the deficiency judgments.
If the subject properties were sold at Sheriff's sale, the
defendants ·would bP
limited by the preliminary injunction from exercising
rights of redemption
which would otherwise be reserYed to them as protection
agai11st a salC' at distress priees.
If plaintiff had joined its claims in the present case
as a separat<• causf.' of action in the officer and director
liability proceeding and hacl o htainccl a judgmeut setting
asidP the c01weyanc<>s, the subject propPrty would have
heen hPld witl10nt sale nntil the Pxtent of plaintiff's claims
against the clefrndants, if any, wen• aseertninf'd and de20

termined. In bringing the present action separately,
plaintiff has been gratnitiously awarded a remedy in excPss of what it requested of the court, and is seeking
to obtain indirectly, through fragmentation of actions,
a rPmedy which would not have been granted if brought
in consolidated form and which should not be granted
in this proceeding.
Plaintiff also elected a remedy precluding present
;-;ale of the snbject property by founding its action to set
a;-;ide the conveyances npon the theory of an unmatured
tort claim. (See Transcript, page 4, lines 9-14, as correct('d; pagf' 28, lines 20-27.)
On page 18 of plaintiff's post-trial memorandum the
annotation at 73 ALR 2d 749 is cited for the position that
.. TT nder our statute and in most jurisdictions . . . the
right is afforded a tort claimant whose clajm has not
matured to judgment to attack conveyances as being
fraudnlent." What the plaintiff fails to point out is that
tlwsl::' jurisdictions referred to as "most jurisdictions"
awl as set forth in the citation consist of fourteen states,
eight of
do not have the UFCA. Even among those
havi11g the UFCA at least two states have recognized
1l1e need for affirmative enactment of statutes specifically
authorizing extraordinary relief prior to final adjudication of the claims.
Sevt>ral cases decided under the UFCA have followed
tlw clear and well reasoned holding of the New Jersey
eonrt which says:

21

The rnle, both in England and in this state, is
that the statute extends its protection to all persons having a valid cause of action arising from
torts as well as from contracts .... Nevertheless,
a tort claimant, to place himself in the position of
a lawful creditor or person compe tent under the
statute to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, must
reduce his claim to judgment, and thus establish
a legal debt against the framlnlent grantor. When
his claim has thus been liquidated and estabished
as a lawful debt, he may attack a voluntary conveyance made, after the liability arose and before
suit was bronght, to defeat his debt, on the theory
that such judgment, when oncf' obtained, relates
back and establishes a debt as of the time when
the original cause of action accrued. Washington
Nat. Bank v. Beatty, 77 N.J. Eq. 252, 76 A. 442,
4-44 (1910). (Citations omitted)
1

Sound reasons exist for refusing to set aside conveyances on mere allegation, and remedies based upon
unproved allegations merit carefully snpenised procedures and the posting of security for ·wrongful interferwith property, as typified by the safeguards provided with respect to restraining orders and injunctions.
(SeP Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.) None of
these safeguards is embodied in the statute whereunder
the plaintiff asks the eonrt to set aside conveyances of
two or three .wars ago and restrain the grantJ'rs from
dealing effectin'l_\r with the propert_\r for an indetPrminafr tinw, possibl:r many .\·ears, until plaintiff has completed discovenr, trial, possible appeals and other unforeseen dPlays - all without sPcuring defendants in the
c>vent plaintiff is wrong (<:'Yen in good faith) about the
merits of his elairns again:o;t dPfendants in a separate
action.
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l\lorPov1:>r, evidence presented at trial indicates that
to the conveyances of subject properties to
Steven L. Grow, he expended considerable time, effort
and money in proving, repairing, and preserving the
properties, and that he assumed and paid various mortgage vayments, instalment contract payments, and tax.es.
(S<'e Transcript, page 53, lines 4-23; page 54, lines 3-23;
pag-e 58, lines 23-26; page GO, lines 2-13; page 62, lines
4-14; page G4, lines 15-30; page 65, lines 1-7; page 140,
lines 10-21; page 142, lines lG-30.)

Nneh Pxpenditnres vest in defendant Steven L. Grow an
<·qnitable interest in the subject properties, the precise
mo11etary value of which interest has not been determined
by the conrt. After entry of the lower court's decision
hut before judgment was reinstated, defendants moved
tlw court for further hearings to determine the value of
Stewn L. Grow's et1nitable interest in the subject propertit>s as a necessary prerequisite to their sale or other
disposition (Desi!,>1lation of Record on Appeal, Item No.
8). Such further hearing is still required to define the
interest in the properties being made the subject of Sheriff's sale.
CONCLUSION
At trial plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case in chief before resting, and defendants' motion for
:rnrnrnary judgment shonld have been granted. The case
should be remanded to the lower court with instructions
to enter the summary judgment. In the alternative, the
dt>cree of tlH' lower court should be amended by eliminat-
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ing that portion requiring sale of the subject premises,
deferring any sale thereof until plaintiff's tort claims are
matured and reduced to judgment or until the preliminary injunction i::,; terminated in the officer and director
liability action. If summary judgment for defendants
is not entered, then the case should be remanded to the
lower court for furtlwr hearings to detl:'rmine the value of
Stevt>n L. Grow's equitable interest in the subject properties.
Respectfully ::,;ubnutted,
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EXHIBIT "A"
SCHEDULE OF DEFICIENCY Jl"'."DG11ENTS A<JAINST CORPORATE GRAKTORS
Lower
Court
File
No.

Date of
Original
Judgment

Date of
Deficiency
Judgment

Date of
Return of
Execution
Unsatisfied

2/29/68
2/29/68
4/11/68
4/11/68
4/11/68
5/28/68

4/ 1/68
4/ 1/68
5/15/68
5/15/68
5/15/68
7/ 8/68
2/28/69

5/23/29
5/23/69
5/23/69
5/23/69
5/23/69
5/23/69

9/21/66

31,284 Allied Develomr,ent (First Fidelity)
31,225
31,264
31,224

2/29/68
2/29/68
6/ 4/68
6/21/68

4/ 1/68
4/ 1/68
7/ 8/68
7/19/68

5/23/69
5/23/69
5/23/69
5/23/69

3/20/67

31,210 Town & Country Real Estate Co.

2/29/68

4/ 1/68

5/23/69

12/28/66
1/ 6/68
10/25/66

31,208 Western ..and, et al.
31,429

2/29/68
5/17/68

4/ 1/68
6/18/68

5/23/69
5/23/69

10/30/67
1/26/68

31,209
N)

01

Dates of
Conveyances
of Subject
Properties
by this
Defendant

31,342
31,213
31,226
31,212
31,301
32,800

Defendant
Grow Investment & Mortgage and Property
Investment

"

EXHIBIT "B"
SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS' E·VIDENCE AT
TRIAL THAT THE
\VERE
FAIRLY TRANSACTED
Plaintiff's
E.rlzibit
NnmlJPr

Common Name
Description

1

Oak Dell

2

Oak Dell

G

Kaleel

7

Kaleel

N)

O'l

Defedants' Ez·idenre at Trial Indicated

(a) ThC'se prnperties ·were accumulated under an express
family agreement that they constituted an inheritance and repayment for services performed in lieu
of cash or bonds. (Transcript, }>age 69, Lines 6-11)
(b) The motiYe for conveyance of these properties
was the natural love and affection of the Gro\vs for
their children, and was devoid of any intent to hinder
an:v creditors. (Transcript, page 7:3, Lines 14-19)
( c) These conveyances were made hy grantors who were
tht>n, and who are now, solvent, holding considerable
assets, and no deficiency judgments were outstanding against them at the time of these conveyances or
time of trial. (Transcript page 28, lines 101-109, 152153)

Lot 17, Block 3
(vacant lot with
pressure water
easement

(a) This lot \ms a deficit to corporate grantors because
non-dewlopable. It was granted to Steven as Trustee
to find amicable use for the property. (Transcript,
page 64, Lines 15-30; page 65, Lines 1-7).
(b) Constituted a nuisance and created ill-will
the corporation could not reasonably expend funds
for its development. (Transcript, page 65, Lines 26-

29).

4

Stricken

8

Geneva Heights
Martinez home

t-:>

-:i

(a) Purchaser under a uniform real estate contract had
an equity in the home. (Transcript, page 50, Lines
13-17)
(b) At the time of conveyance, the home was in bad repair, was encumbered by multiple delinquent mortgages, and the investment possibilities for the grantor corporation wen• unfavorable. (Transcript, page
53, Lines 4-23)

( c) The grantor corporation had made repeated efforts
to sell the
bnt to no avail. (Transcript, page
64, Lines 3-23)
( d) Grantee's condition for acceptance of the property
was premised on his removing the present undesirtenants. (Transcript, page 57, Lines 1-3)
resulted in a financial benefit to the
( P) The
corporation upon assnmption of existing mortgages
by the grantee. (Transcript, page 58, Lines 23-26)
( f) Grantee expended snbstantial time and money in an
e £fort to bring the uniform real estate contract currPnt. (Transcript, page 140, Lines 10-20)

(g) Grantee
corporate grm1tor of burdensome
liability h>- assuming a $7,000 mortgage. (Transcript,
page 140, Lines 17-21)

9

Kartchner Home

(a) Urantor conyeyt>d onl:, an assie,rnment of right it had
acquired 11ndt>r a real estate contract which included
an assumed obligation for monthly payment. (Transcript page 61, Lines 15-20)
(b) ·when conveyance was made, the home was in a state
of great disrepair, making continued possession and
financing by the corporate grantor imprudent.
(Transcript, page 62, Lines 4-14)
( c) During the six years immediately preceding the conveyance the corporate grantor had operated the
property at a net loss in excess of $1,500. (Transcript, page 63, Lines 23-30; page 64, Lines 1-4)
( d) Grantee relieved the corporated grantor of unprofitable investment by assuming the $5,050 mortgage.
('rranscript, page 146, Lines 19-22)
( e) Grantee actually exercised dominion and control over
all these premises. (Transcript, page 147; Lines 2127)

(Same as
Ko. 10)

Lot 3, Block 5 Linford Home

(a) The home at time of conveyance was in a state of
great disrepair.
page 60, Lines 2-13)

(b) rnw granteC' relieved the corporate" grantor of liabilities accruing from delinquent mortgage. (Transcript, page 60.)
( c) Grnnte0 expended snhstantial fnnds to pay debts
which the- corporate grantor had accnmnlated in the
form of delinqnent taxes and mortgage payments.
(Tnrnscript.
14:2, Lines 16-::lO)

Generally:

(a) Althongh servicC's rendered by child for his parents
cannot constitute valnable consideration prior to the
child's majority:
( 1) The grantee p0rforrned valuable services :,;ubsequent to his majority. (Transcript, page 73,
Lines 6-14)

( 2) 'l'he grantee performed val nab le but othenvise
uncompensated services for the benefit of thP
corporate grantors, which have no claim upon
the grantee's services prior to grantee's majority. (Transcript, page 111)

